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11 Introduction
Much legislation is usefully viewed as imposing a tax on all legislators (or
their constituents) and distributing the beneﬁts among only some individuals
or groups. It may therefore appear that proposed legislation can gain majority
support only if in a majority of districts the amounts distributed exceed the
taxes collected. The existence of large majorities thus suggests wide beneﬁts
from a policy. It is therefore puzzling that redistributive legislation can gain
strong political support though beneﬁts are concentrated among few districts
(as with farm bills).1 In these cases suspicion falls on special interests with
much inﬂuence.
We oﬀer a diﬀerent explanation, allowing current policy proposals and voting
outcomes to depend not only on current beneﬁts, but also on past decisions and
on expectations of future behavior. These implicit connections between policies
was well captured by a study of the Connecticut legislature (Barber 1996) that
reports
But for a considerable number, the relevant patronage is not that
which can be oﬀered here and now, but, in eﬀect, all the patronage
which the leaders are expected to control in the future. For these
members the important thing is to build a favorable record of party
service, so that when and if some opportunity is presented, perhaps
years hence, they will be among the eligibles...Party allegiance is
motivated in part by vague hopes that sometime in the future, should
the member want help of some unspeciﬁed kind—a job, an adminis-
trative decision, a local bill passed—the leadership would remember
his yeoman service in the party ranks. As one legislator said, “It
isn’t what you’ve been promised, it’s what you hope for that helps,
that will swing a person into line.”
1Agricultural policy in the U.S. is periodically renewed. Consider the Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008. It passed in the House (Vote #353) by 306/110 and in the Senate
(Vote #144) by 77/15. Moreover, both the House and the Senate overrode a veto by the Pres-
ident with a 2/3 majority (see the Library of Congress at www.loc.gov). The Environmental
Working Group, a watchdog, oﬀers detailed data on commodity subsidies from 1995–2010 for
400 congressional districts at www.ewg.org; accessed on June 21, 2012. The 24 districts (6%
of all districts listed) that received the largest subsidies obtained 52.8% of the total of $167.3
billion.
2The analysis below formalizes and extends this idea, focusing on the ability
of an agenda setter to use promises and threats to his advantage, showing how he
can induce a majority of legislators to vote for a policy that directly beneﬁts few,
or even none, of them: he threatens legislators voting against him in one period
that he will exclude them from the winning coalition in a following period. We
do not claim that an agenda setter always exploits the legislature; for example,
he may be unable to forbid amendments to a policy he proposes. Rather, one
contribution of our analysis is to point to conditions which allow for exploitation,
and conditions or institutional arrangements which limit it.
A classic example of a legislative leader who long controlled the agenda
and used this power, among other powers, to control policy is Joseph Cannon,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1903 to 1911, and called at
the time the “Tyrant from Illinois.” He was reported to punish disloyal mem-
bers by refusing to schedule their favored legislation, and declining to recognize
them to oﬀer amendments or private bills. When chairing the House Rules
Committee, he limited amendments that could be made on the ﬂoor of the
House. Nevertheless, he did not punish all opponents or reward all supporters.
Our model can explain how an agenda setter can wield great power even when
rewards and punishments are rare or small.
Our analysis is of more than historical interest. Though currently the
Speaker has less power than Cannon enjoyed, congressional committees have
agenda-setting powers, particularly, when the vote on the ﬂoor of the House
of Representatives is made under the closed rule.2 Thus, congressmen with
some agenda-setting power enjoy greater pork-barrel spending in their dis-
tricts. Such congressmen include party leaders (Balla et al. 2002; Hird 1991),
committee chairs (Ferejohn 1974), and members of prestige committees, es-
pecially the Appropriations Committee (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2006).
Members of Congress with proposal power—those sitting on the Transportation
Committee—get more spending on transportation projects in their districts than
do other congressmen (Knight 2005).3
2Price (2006) reports that the incidence of completely closed rules that preclude the oﬀering
of any amendments whatsoever, including the traditional minority substitute, was 28% in the
108th Congress (2003-2005). Doran (2010) reports that the closed rule is now used for half of
the controversial House ﬂoor agenda.
3Because, however, diﬀerent committees may have agenda-setting powers over diﬀerent
policy areas, the beneﬁts members of any one committee can gain may be smaller than the
3A study of earmarks in senatorial bills ﬁnds that the number of earmarks
Senate majority leader Harry Reid received was more than one standard devia-
tion above the mean number of earmarks for the Senate (Engstrom and Vanberg
2010). In both the Senate and the House, members of the Appropriations Com-
mittees received larger earmarks. In the House, party leaders received more
earmarks (Lazarus and Steigerwalt 2009). Similarly, Hardin (1958) argues that
farm policy is ineﬃcient, but nevertheless supported in the U.S. Congress, be-
cause committee chairmen with agenda power come from farm districts.
In diﬀerent settings diﬀerent people can have agenda setting power. Under
fast-track legislation in the U.S., the president proposes a treaty that Congress
can either accept or reject, but not amend. In the European Union, the Com-
mission has signiﬁcant agenda-setting power: in some policy domains, only
the Commission can propose a policy, and the power of the Council and the
Parliament to amend the proposal may be restricted (as by super-majority re-
quirements) depending on the legislative procedure used. Many parliamentary
democracies allow the government to propose a policy as a conﬁdence vote,
which the legislature can adopt or reject, but not amend. In Germany, Finland,
France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the constitution authorizes the government
to make policies questions of conﬁdence. By convention, the government can
make the vote on a speciﬁc policy a question of conﬁdence in Australia, Canada,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Other par-
liaments permit votes of conﬁdence. For example, in 1995 members of the Ital-
ian Lower House proposed more than 150 amendments to a budget introduced
by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister eventually invoked a conﬁdence
vote procedure on his budget package, which the legislature passed without the
amendments.4
The agenda setter could more generally be the bureaucracy, as in the seminal
work by Romer and Rosenthal (1978). But their model underestimates the
agenda setter’s power, because it assumes voters must be indiﬀerent between
the proposal and the status quo, without looking at the bureaucracy’s ability
to punish opponents. Niskanen (1971) similarly assumes that the executive
branch’s power is limited to making take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Thus, they do not
consider the possibility that all voters vote for a policy in some period which
beneﬁts gained by an agenda setter with control over all policy proposals, which we consider.
4This discussion of conﬁdence votes is based on Huber (1996).
4hurts them all. We do.
In our model the agenda setter can credibly punish legislators. Such threats
are observed. When Senator James Buckley tried to delete forty-four public
works projects at the committee stage in the Senate, the members voted down
all his amendments, but cut out projects in his home state (as reported by
Epple and Riordan 1987). Senator William Proximre was similarly punished for
supporting proposals to cut appropriations for the Department of the Interior—a
House-Senate Conference Committee deleted the senator’s favored project from
the Interior appropriations bill (see Ferejohn 1974, p. 114).
Note that the problem we address diﬀers from logrolling. Logrolling has a
majority of legislators support a package of policies which beneﬁt each member
of the majority, though any one component beneﬁts only one legislator. We
consider a policy proposal that hurts all legislators.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews related litera-
ture. Sections 3 and 4 formalize a benchmark model of agenda-setting in which
the proposer controls the agenda: he is the unique proposer, amendments are
not possible, and he is certain to stay in power. Sections 5 and 6 consider dif-
ferent institutional arrangements, investigating whether they can balance power
between the agenda setter and the legislature. This highlights the importance
of, for example, the cohesion of the legislature to sustain tacit collusion against
the agenda setter, or the separation of budgetary powers and entitlements. It
also yields the surprising ﬁnding that a secret ballot alone might not be enough.
The last section contains concluding remarks.
2 Literature
2.1 Agenda setting
Studies of agenda setting usually need to reﬁne equilibrium predictions by con-
sidering ‘simple’ strategies which only depend on current payoﬀ relevant vari-
ables. This precludes investigating the power of promises and threats on which
we focus.
Important early contributions include work by Romer and Rosenthal (1978),
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Baron (1989), and Harrington (1990). They assume
that any legislator can make a proposal, with proposals considered in a random
5order. In proposing and voting on policies, a legislator must thus compare
the beneﬁts from the proposal to the status quo, and to a future proposal in
which the legislator might be excluded from the minimum winning coalition.
The sequence of proposal makers gives an early proposer power to gain more
beneﬁts to himself than other members of the majority gain. As we shall see,
in our model the agenda setter is yet more powerful.
These models suppose that the amount spent is ﬁxed; because the legislators
cannot abolish a program, the issue is only who gets the money. We instead
allow for zero spending: if the majority votes against a proposal taxes are zero.
So we can speak of the legislators adopting a proposal that hurts each of them.
Recent contributions consider endogenously evolving default policies, and
yield exploitation results closer to ours. How legislators can obtain local beneﬁts
is discussed by Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo (2006), who consider the default
policy changing from period to period, a single policy implemented in the ﬁnal
period, and the agenda setter in each period oﬀering a policy which depends on
the policy that was most recently adopted. The authors show that a majority
may support a pork-barrel policy which hurts almost every legislator. Anesi and
Seidmann (2013) show in a related model that even a non-proposer may obtain
all of the surplus. Other papers consider a sequence of policies. Kalandrakis
(2004) models a legislature in which a player is selected at random to make a
proposal in each round. The proposal is pitted against the status quo, with the
winning alternative becoming the status quo in the next round of bargaining.
The equilibrium has the proposer eventually extract all beneﬁts for himself in
all periods. If, however, a policy can be reconsidered, then legislators have an
incentive to protect each other and limit the power of the agenda setter (see
Diermeier and Fong 2011).
2.2 Size of winning coalitions
The literature looks at two extreme forms of winning coalitions. One ap-
proach, introduced by Riker (1962), predicts the existence of minimum winning
coalitions—why should the agenda setter, or for that matter any member of the
majority, oﬀer anything to the minority. The agenda-setting models described
above also predict minimum winning coalitions.
The other extreme examines conditions under which policies will be passed
by very large majorities, with beneﬁts going to almost all legislators. Legislators
6operating under a “veil of ignorance” (they do not know which coalitions will
form in the future) will adopt a norm of universalism that calls for all legislators
to beneﬁt from pork barrel projects (Weingast 1979, Shepsle and Weingast 1981,
and Grofman 1984). Costs of drafting policy can aﬀect the policies a legislator
proposes, by inducing him to propose policies which are supported by a large
majority of legislators (Glazer and McMillan 1992), or by proposing policies
which other legislators would later not want to amend (Glazer and McMillan
1990). An extension of the Baron and Ferejohn model to consider incomplete
information is given by Tsai and Yang (2010), showing that oversized coalitions
may appear. Relatedly, the Baron-Ferejohn model with sequential voting is
examined by Norman (2002), who shows that any allocation of beneﬁts can
constitute an equilibrium. But in their setting no one suﬀers from adoption of
a policy; in our model all legislators prefer that the agenda setter’s proposal be
rejected.
2.3 Punishing opponents and rewarding supporters
The idea that a political leader can exercise power by rewarding supporters and
punishing opponents is of course not novel. The Introduction mentioned how
Joseph Cannon, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, used such tools.
The previous papers discussed had an agenda setter ignore how legislators voted
in the past in deciding what proposal to make. When such history is considered,
punishment strategies can arise, giving an agenda setter much power.
Dal B´ o (2007) analyzes how an outside party can use bribes that are condi-
tional on the realized voting proﬁle to inﬂuence committee decisions. He shows
that a special interest group can generate unanimous approval, although in
equilibrium payments are very small. His key insight is that “pivotal bribes,”
in which a legislator is paid if and only if he casts a decisive vote for the policy,
render the voting game a multilateral prisoners’ dilemma.5 Though the analy-
sis below relies on these insights, the inﬂuence mechanism diﬀers from his—we
allow compensations to be conditioned only on a legislator’s vote, which under
his model does not allow for costless capture. Moreover, in Dal B´ o the special
interest is assumed to commit to payments it will make after votes are realized,
5The model is extended by Console-Battilana and Shepsle (2009), who consider payments
that either the president or lobbying groups can make to induce legislators to conﬁrm the
appointment of a supreme court justice.
7whereas in our setting compensations are costless for the agenda setter and
thus credible. Lastly, whereas Dal B´ o allows for cash payments, in much of our
analysis the agenda setter is restricted to excluding or including legislators in a
minimum winning coalition in a future period. That limitation may appear to
limit greatly an agenda-setter’s power in earlier periods; we show when it does
not.
An agenda setter who can exclude from the majority coalition legislators
who had voted against him can capture a large share of the budget (Baron and
Ferejohn 1989, Cotton 2010, and Fan, Ali, and Bernheim 2010). Our results
are even stronger: the agenda setter can have much power even under a ﬁnite
horizon, and in equilibrium the majority in some periods are made strictly worse
oﬀ by the policy they pass.
An incumbent, even one who pursues policies that most oppose, can stay
in power if members of the incumbent’s winning coalition are more likely to
become members of the winning coalition in the future than are members of
the challenger’s coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002). The PRI party
in Mexico maintained power by threatening districts that did not support it
that they will be denied private beneﬁts from the central government which the
PRI controlled (see Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003). Relatedly,
a group’s fear of later falling under an ineﬃcient and venal ruler that favors
another group can suﬃce to discipline supporters (Padr´ o i Miquel 2007). And
in discussing governance, Dixit (2009) argues that private order can be sustained
by the threat of expulsion. Punishment strategies can be more eﬀective if the
principal has some discretion, as we show below in considering entitlements.
The importance of discretion in allowing punishment is analyzed by Bernheim
and Whinston (1998), who show that when some outcomes cannot be veriﬁed,
eﬃciency can be enhanced when the obligations of contracting parties are left
vague or unspeciﬁed.
The power of an agenda setter to punish opponents is considered by Epple
and Riordan (1987), who examine repeated interactions, with diﬀerent individ-
uals having the right to propose policies in diﬀerent periods, showing that a
wide range of allocations can be sustained as equilibria by the threat of political
banishment. Like them, we suppose that the punishment for defection is exclu-
sion, which in equilibrium is not invoked. Their result on plutocracy resembles
our result about the agenda setter exploiting others. But whereas they consider
8punishment by multiple legislators, we consider punishment by the agenda set-
ter. They consider an inﬁnite horizon whereas we have a ﬁnite horizon. And
whereas they consider complicated strategies, ours is simple. Moreover, we ex-
tend the analysis in several ways, including sequential voting, tacit collusion,
and the agenda setter’s decision of whether to privilege the status quo.
3 Assumptions
We start the analysis with a simple benchmark model. Most assumptions are
generalized in later sections.
There are four players. One person, say the President, or the Speaker of the
House, or the majority of a legislative committee, is the agenda setter in each of
two periods.6 He, and only he, can propose a policy. The legislature consists of
three members. The agenda setter’s proposal is adopted if a majority of legisla-
tors vote for it. Votes are public and simultaneous. The agenda setter does not
vote. This is consistent with an interpretation of the agenda setter as the U.S.
President who is not a member of Congress, or the European Commission that
submits a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.7
In each of two periods the agenda setter proposes a policy that costs a dollar,
and that divides that dollar among the three legislators and himself. The cost
of any policy is divided equally among the three legislators.8 No costs arise in
a given period when the proposal is rejected.
In period 2 the agenda setter can propose any distribution of the dollar.
6Consistent with our assumptions, Primo (2002) notes that most political bargaining in
the U.S. Congress has only one actor make a formal proposal. Also, consistent with our
assumption that the agenda setter remains in power, Cotton (2010) reports that agenda-
setting authority in the U.S. Congress rarely changes hands. Since the ﬁrst U.S. Congress in
1789, for example, there have been only 59 changes in the Speaker of the House, of which no
more than 24 can be attributed to the speaker losing support amongst his party. Diermeier
and Fong (2011) give further examples of institutions, among them central banks, in which
an agenda setter persistently controls proposals.
7Were the agenda setter a voting member of the legislature, he would ﬁnd it easier to
win approval for his proposal—he would need the support of fewer legislators (just one other
legislator is needed as opposed to two in our setting, in which the agenda setter has no vote).
8 An alternative version of our model considers a legislature composed of three legislators,
who each pay taxes and vote, with one of them the agenda setter. This would not change our
qualitative results; details are available upon request (and for the convenience of the referees
included in Appendix B.1, which is not intended for publication).
9In period 1, however, he must treat each legislator equally; he cannot target
a subset of legislators or make the payments conditional on votes. We oﬀer
two justiﬁcations. First, as we show in the context of Proposition 1 below,
sometimes the agenda setter can obtain the whole surplus in period 1 and thus
prefers not to build a minimum winning coalition in both periods. In this case
our assumption is innocuous and simpliﬁes the exposition. Second, as we will
see in the context of Proposition 2 below, sometimes the agenda setter would
do better without this restriction. In this case our assumption makes it more
diﬃcult to explain support for the period 1 proposal, and so makes our results
more striking.9
The agenda setter maximizes his beneﬁts, subject to the constraint that his
proposal is approved only if a majority of legislators vote for it. We describe
the agenda setter’s possibilities in period 1 as follows. He proposes to impose
a tax of 1/3 on each legislator, to give s  1/3 to each legislator, and to give
the remainder of the budget to himself. Optimization by the agenda setter
requires minimizing the side payments s; we will investigate how s depends on
the institutional constraints.
Each legislator cares only about the net beneﬁts he gets, and votes for a
proposal if the present discounted value of voting for the proposal exceeds the
present discounted value of voting against.
We look at sub-game perfect, or time-consistent, solutions. Collusion in a
two-period model is therefore impossible. Denote the intertemporal discount
factor by δ > 0. The time line is as follows
1. The agenda setter proposes a policy
2. The agenda setter’s proposal is adopted if a majority of legislators vote
for it
3. Payoﬀs are realized
4. The agenda setter again proposes a policy
5. The agenda setter’s proposal is adopted if a majority of legislators vote
for it
9For example, in the context of Proposition 2 below, without this restriction the agenda
setter could secure approval of his proposal in period 1 at lower cost to himself by oﬀering a
share of the dollar to only two legislators.
106. Payoﬀs are realized
4 Benchmark result
Let the agenda setter use the following strategy. In period 1 he threatens that
any legislator who votes against the proposal will be politically banished, in
the sense that his chance of becoming a member of a future minimum winning
coalition is smaller than that of a legislator who voted for the proposal. In
period 2, the agenda setter proposes to split a dollar equally with the members
of a minimum winning coalition. Any legislator who supported him in period 1
has an equal chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period
2.10 If a minimum winning coalition requires more members than the number of
legislators who supported the proposal in period 1, then the remaining members
are chosen with equal probability among the legislators who opposed the agenda
setter in period 1. Call this the exclusion strategy.
Consider period 2. No member of the minimum winning coalition gains by
rejecting the proposal, and the proposal is supported by a majority. There
does exist an equilibrium in which all legislators vote against the proposal in
period 2—no one legislator’s vote can then change the outcome, and thus no
legislator has an incentive to deviate. This equilibrium, however, is not robust to
a trembling hand. If with some small probability one of the legislators will vote
for the agenda setter’s proposal in period 2, then a legislator favored by that
proposal strictly prefers to vote in favor. In what follows we use this reﬁnement,
supposing that the period 2 proposal is accepted. We shall refer to equilibria in
which this reﬁnement applies as robust equilibria.
Turn now to period 1. Given that all legislators face the same situation, we
focus on a symmetric equilibrium in pure voting strategies. Consider a given
legislator who expects all other legislators to vote for the proposal. Notice
that a single vote does not change the outcome of the collective decision which
approves the proposal. A legislator who votes for the proposal has a 2/3 chance
of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period 2, in which case his
beneﬁt is 1/3. So, considering the taxes he will pay, his expected net beneﬁt
10Norman (2002) makes a similar assumption. But we make the assumption of equal chances
for simplicity; the results hold under weaker assumptions (see the discussion after Proposition
1).
11when he votes for the proposal is  1/3(1+δ)+s+δ2/9. A legislator who votes
against the proposal will be excluded from the minimum winning coalition in
period 2; his payoﬀ is only  1/3(1+δ)+s. Thus, for any s a legislator strictly
prefers to support the agenda setter’s proposal in period 1. It is an equilibrium
for each legislator to vote for that proposal.11
The agenda setter maximizes his surplus by setting s = 0; and because he
obtains the largest possible surplus, clearly he has no better strategy. In period
1 he obtains the whole surplus, whereas in period 2 his surplus is maximized
subject to the constraint that the proposal be accepted. Further reducing the
share given members of the minimum winning coalition in period 2 would yield
strictly negative beneﬁts to each member, causing them to reject the proposal.
The above strategies thus constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Moreover, a Nash equilibrium in pure voting strategies cannot have all leg-
islators in period 1 vote against the proposal. Assume they do. Again a single
vote does not change the outcome of the collective decision which rejects the
proposal. But a legislator who votes for the proposal in period 1 will belong
to the minimum winning coalition in period 2. Hence, a legislator who votes
for the proposal has zero payoﬀ in period 2. Opposing the proposal reduces the
chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period 2, so that total
payoﬀs are 0 + δ(2/9   1/3). The diﬀerence is δ/9 > 0, which represents the
beneﬁt from ensuring membership in the minimum winning coalition in period
2. Thus, a legislator strictly prefers to vote for the proposal in period 1; it is
not an equilibrium for all legislators to vote against it.
We summarize with
Proposition 1 A symmetric sub-game perfect equilibrium in pure voting strate-
gies exists in which
 the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = 0 and
11We do not have data on whether overwhelming majorities support policies which beneﬁt
the agenda setter. But data do show that much legislation is passed with very large majori-
ties. King and Zeckhauser (2003) report that in the 1997-98 session of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 324 non-procedural roll-call votes, which constitute 42% of the total, passed
with more than 300 votes in a chamber with 435 members. The results are not atypical.
Data on the U.S. House of Representatives over the years 1873-1998 show that overwhelming
majorities (with ninety percent of those voting on the same side) appear on over forty percent
of the roll-call votes in several sessions, and occur on over 25 percent of the roll-call votes in
about half of the congressional sessions (Gaines and Sala 2000).
12 in period 1 the legislature unanimously approves the agenda setter's pro-
posal; in period 2 a minimum winning coalition approves the proposal the
agenda setter makes in that period.
Moreover, for any exclusion strategy with s  0, it is not a robust equilibrium
for legislators to vote unanimously against the agenda setter's proposal in period
1.
The qualitative results are not a knife-edge; they do not require that in period
2 the agenda setter must be indiﬀerent about the composition of his coalition.
First, for emotional reasons, in period 2 the agenda setter may prefer to exclude
someone who had voted against him in period 1. Second, it is true that the
agenda setter randomizes among the legislators that supported his proposal in
period 1. But his motivation is analogous to the classical argument in favor of
mixed-strategies, namely that mixed-strategies produce unpredictable choices
that cannot be exploited by the members of the legislature. Third, all that is
needed for the results is that a legislator who voted for the proposal in period
1 will more likely belong to the winning coalition in period 2 than a legislator
who voted against. The agenda setter’s choice would be equally unpredictable if
it were common knowledge that if all legislators vote for the proposal in period
1, legislators 1, 2 and 3 will be included in the minimum winning coalition in
period 2 with probability 1/3, 2/3 and 1, respectively.12
The behavior of legislators could make voters in any one legislative district
dislike what the legislature does (adopt policies that hurt all districts), but like
what the legislator from their own district does (minimize losses to the district,
given how other legislators vote). In the United States, that would lead voters
to hate Congress but to like their own congressman, a pattern consistent with
polling results. For example, a Gallup poll in 2013 ﬁnds the common pattern
that “...when thinking about Congress as a whole, Americans are nearly as sour
as they have ever been, but when they think just about their own representative,
12 We could derive asymmetric probabilities analogously to recent micro-foundations for
contest success functions by Corch´ on and Dahm (2010 and 2011). One possibility assumes
that the agenda setter is not indiﬀerent about the identity of the legislators included in the
period 2 minimum winning coalition, and legislators are uncertain about the agenda setter’s
preferences. Details are available upon request (and for the convenience of the referees included
in Appendix B.2, which is not intended for publication).
13they feel much better about the job that person is doing.”13
Proposition 1 imposes two restrictions that when relaxed might lead to fur-
ther equilibria: period 1 voting strategies are symmetric and pure. We explore in
the next subsection the existence of asymmetric equilibria. In Appendix A.1 we
show that even allowing for mixed voting strategies, the equilibrium in Propo-
sition 1 is the unique robust symmetric equilibrium when the discount factor is
suﬃciently large (roughly greater than 0.6). For low discount factors, an equilib-
rium with mixed strategies exists. But it is not surprising that the agenda setter
loses power as the future becomes less important, because his power is based on
his ability to allocate future beneﬁts. Moreover, even with mixed strategies the
legislature approves the period 1 proposal with positive probability, implying
that the agenda setter can sometimes exploit the legislature.
4.1 Eliminating asymmetric equilibria with side payments
Suppose legislators respond to the exclusion strategy (when s = 0) by playing
asymmetric pure voting strategies in period 1.14 Then the agenda setter’s pay-
oﬀs in period 1 are zero; he could beneﬁt by increasing s. We therefore ask
whether some side payment s  1/3 eliminates asymmetric equilibria in period
1, and assures approval of the agenda setter’s proposal in period 1. And if such
an s exists, we determine its minimum value.
Consider the decision of some legislator in period 1. In an asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium some legislator, whose vote is decisive, votes against the
proposal. In voting for the proposal he obtains  1/3(1+δ)+s+δ/3; opposing
yields  δ/3 + δ/6. A vote in favor is advantageous if and only if s  (2   δ)/6.
Notice that (2 δ)/6 strictly decreases in δ, and lies in the interval [1/6,1/3]. The
more important the future, the more valuable the future beneﬁts of membership
in the minimum winning coalition, and the easier it is for the agenda setter to
sway the legislator. Moreover, for any δ > 0, some feasible payment yields the
agenda setter strictly positive payoﬀs in period 1, and induces legislators to vote
for the proposal. Thus, asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria in period 1 which
13http : ==www:gallup:com=poll=162362=americans   down   congress   own  
representative:aspx
14This requires identical legislators to behave diﬀerently. Coordination of legislators on some
particular form of asymmetric behavior must be based on some underlying asymmetry which
should be modeled explicitly. A natural explanation would be a sequential voting procedure.
This extension is considered in Subsection 4.2.
14reject the agenda setter’s proposal disappear.
To show that this strategy of the agenda setter and unanimous approval in
period 1 are an equilibrium, it remains to consider a given legislator who is not
decisive. As the vote does not change the outcome in period 1, but increases the
legislator’s chances of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period 2,
for any s he strictly prefers to vote in favor.
Thus, it is optimal for the agenda setter to oﬀer s = (2 δ)/6. This value is
the smallest payment that in period 1 makes it a (weakly) dominant strategy for
each legislator to vote for the proposal. As a result, it overcomes the diﬃculty
that legislators could coordinate on an asymmetric equilibrium in period 1.
The above strategies thus constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium. We
summarize with
Proposition 2 Suppose legislators respond to the exclusion strategy (for low
s) by playing asymmetric pure strategies in period 1. Then a sub-game perfect
equilibrium exists in which
 the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = (2   δ)/6 and
 in period 1 the legislature unanimously approves the agenda setter's pro-
posal; in period 2 a minimum winning coalition approves the proposal the
agenda setter makes in that period.
4.2 Agenda-setting power when each vote is decisive
The equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2 base the agenda setter’s ex-
clusion strategy on two characteristics. First, in equilibrium no individual leg-
islator is decisive and therefore cannot block the proposal in period 1. Second,
the agenda setter can condition future beneﬁts or political exclusion on votes
in period 1.15 To show that what drives our result is the second characteris-
tic, we modify our previous assumptions and suppose that voting is sequential,
with voting order 1, 2, 3. As a consequence, under sequential voting in period
1 which approves the proposal, some legislator knows that he is decisive. The
individual voting incentives are the same as those in period 1 for legislators who
play the asymmetric equilibrium which we analyzed above.
15Under a secret ballot future beneﬁts or political exclusion can in principle not be condi-
tioned on votes cast in period 1. Subsection 5.2 discusses conditions under which Proposition
1 continues to hold.
15As before, assume that the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy. Se-
quential voting does not change the incentives in period 2, and in period 2 a
minimum winning coalition will support the proposal.
Suppose the agenda setter sets low payments, say s = 0. Then in period 1
a legislator votes against the proposal if and only if he is decisive. Therefore,
legislator 1 votes for the proposal, and free rides on the negative votes of the
other two legislators.
On the other hand, Proposition 2 already showed that suﬃciently high pay-
ments in period 1 make it a (weakly) dominant strategy for each legislator to
vote for the proposal in period 1. We thus have the following results:
Corollary 1 Under sequential voting, a sub-game perfect equilibrium exists in
which
 the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = (2   δ)/6 and
 in period 1 the legislature unanimously supports the agenda setter's pro-
posal; in period 2 a minimum winning coalition supports the proposal the
agenda setter makes in that period.
Comparing Corollary 1 to Proposition 1 shows that sequential voting beneﬁts
legislators, but does not eliminate the agenda setter’s power.
4.3 Agenda-setting power and a legislator's pivotal prob-
ability
As shown above, under simultaneous voting (Proposition 1) no legislator is de-
cisive; in contrast, some legislator is decisive under sequential voting (Corollary
1). On the other hand, whereas simultaneous voting does not require side pay-
ments, sequential voting does and therefore limits agenda-setting power.
To show that side payments are monotonically increasing (and agenda-
setting power is monotonically decreasing) in a legislator’s pivotal probability,
we make a small change to our previous assumptions and suppose that for some
legislator a small beneﬁt in the future may not suﬃce to induce him to vote for
the proposal in period 1. He may have “non-consequentialist” motivations, for
example, because he wishes to express a preference through the act of voting
(see Shayo and Harel 2012 for an overview and experimental evidence for this
16voting behavior). Assume that with probability p one of the legislators has this
attitude and rejects the proposal. The other two legislators are then pivotal,
and so p also measures the pivotal probability.16
Consider the other two legislators. With probability p they are in the same
voting situation as under sequential voting; with probability 1  p the situation
is similar to simultaneous voting. It is straightforward to see that each of the
two legislators prefers to support the agenda setter’s proposal in period 1 if and
only if
s  ˜ s(p)  max
{
2   δ
6
 
1   p
p
2δ
9
,0
}
.
The threshold ˜ s(p) increases monotonically in the pivotal probability p, until
the payments under sequential voting are reached. Notice also that for low values
of the pivotal probability, ˜ s(p) is constant and zero. Therefore the assumption
of completely consequentialist voters who are solely motivated by preferences
over policy outcomes can be somewhat relaxed without aﬀecting the result in
Proposition 1.
4.4 Observations
Several comments are in order.
First, in the above equilibria a legislator’s expected beneﬁt is  1/3(1+δ)+
˜ s(p)+δ2/9. Given the size of the diﬀerent payments ˜ s(p), legislators obtain lower
expected payoﬀs than were both proposals rejected. In period 1 all legislators
vote for a policy that hurts all of them.
Second, exploitation is most severe under the conditions of Proposition 1,
and exploitation declines with a legislator’s pivotal probability. So agenda-
setting power is sensitive to the institutions and behavioral conditions under
which agenda-setting takes place. Later sections further analyze the sensitiv-
ity of our conclusions to variations of our assumptions. The monotonicity of
side payments in the pivotal probability suggests that agenda setters are more
powerful in large legislatures, but these issues are not explicitly modeled here.
Third, under simultaneous voting (Proposition 1) no legislator is decisive; in
contrast, some legislator is decisive under sequential voting (Corollary 1). Thus,
16The alternative assumption that with probability p any of the three legislators has “non-
consequentialist” motivations yields qualitatively the same results. The exposition, however,
is more complex because p no longer measures the pivotal probability.
17the indiﬀerence of a legislator who is not decisive strengthens our result, but is
not crucial for unanimous approval in period 1.
Fourth, in the basic model (under the conditions of Proposition 1) legis-
lators do not have a dominant strategy and thus do not ﬁnd themselves in a
multilateral prisoners’ dilemma (in which ﬁxing the action of one player, the
others are in a prisoners’ dilemma). But side payments increase the incentives
for defection, thereby allowing the agenda setter to eliminate the asymmetric
voting equilibrium.
Fifth, crucial for unanimous approval is the agenda setter’s ability in period
2 to reward a legislator who supported the agenda setter’s proposal in period 1.
A unanimity rule in period 2 breaks this link between the periods because then
in period 2 every vote is needed and no legislator can be excluded. On the other
hand, any scarce resource controlled by the agenda setter and valued by legisla-
tors could establish such a link. In some situations it is reasonable to interpret
the president as the agenda setter. Rewards could then consist, for example, of
invitations to the White House, fundraisers, or campaign appearances. In other
situations one might think of party leaders as agenda setters, with rewards con-
sisting of committee assignments and money from political action committees
to reelection campaigns, which are controlled by party leaders.
Sixth, it is not necessary for the result in Proposition 1 that the agenda
setter punish with certainty a legislator who opposed the proposal in period 1.
It suﬃces that in period 2 the agenda setter can exclude a legislator with a small
but strictly positive probability. This result can reconcile the view by historians
that Joseph Cannon, as Speaker of the US House of Representatives, exercised
power by punishing opponents, with the ﬁndings by Krehbiel and Wiseman
(2001) that in making committee appointments Cannon did not consistently
reward supporters or punish opponents. For, as we saw, what matters is that
when a legislator is not decisive, the cost to him of voting for a policy he dislikes
is small or even zero, so that if he expects even a small gain from membership
in the winning coalition in a future period, he will support the agenda setter’s
policy. Strong loyalty can appear under weak punishments and rewards.
Seventh, the exclusion strategy which allows the agenda setter to exploit the
legislators in period 1 can also be used by the agenda setter to stay in power.
Suppose that in some period before the ﬁnal one a motion is made to depose
the agenda setter. The incumbent agenda setter can threaten that if he stays
18in power, then in the ﬁnal period he will give preference for membership in the
minimum winning coalition to any legislator who had voted against the motion.
Then as in the previous analysis, it is a Nash equilibrium for all legislators to
vote to retain the agenda setter, even though he had exploited them and may
exploit them in the future.
Eighth, it is not strictly necessary that the agenda setter’s proposal cannot
be amended in any period. What is critical is that in the ﬁnal period his
proposal cannot be amended. For in any non-ﬁnal period, the agenda setter can
use the exclusion strategy against any legislator who proposes an amendment,
and against any legislator who votes for an amendment. In the ﬁnal period, if
the agenda setter’s proposal cannot be amended, he can indeed implement the
exclusion strategy, punishing legislators who had voted against him.
Ninth, although we spoke of forming a minimum winning coalition in period
2, similar results can appear when in period 2 the agenda setter is very busy,
willing to help legislators with their legislative needs, but giving priority to
legislators who had supported him in the past.
Lastly, the benchmark result continues to hold under more general condi-
tions, among them larger legislatures or legislators who value the future diﬀer-
ently.17 We consider in the next section further institutions that do not limit
the agenda setter’s power and turn in Section 6 to institutions that limit his
power.
5 Institutions that do not limit the agenda set-
ter's power
Some institutional arrangements, such as secret voting, may at ﬁrst sight appear
to restrict greatly, or even to eliminate, the agenda setter’s power. We show,
however, that they do not.
17 For large legislatures see Subsection 5.3; for heterogeneous legislators details are available
upon request (and for the convenience of the referees included in Appendix B.3, which is not
intended for publication).
195.1 Term limits and turnover
One might expect that term limits and turnover reduce the agenda setter’s
ability to punish or reward legislators. For that result to hold, however, the end
of the legislators’ terms must be close and certain.
Suppose that each district might be represented in the second period by
a diﬀerent legislator. That is, each legislator in period 1 continues only with
some probability in period 2. It is easy to see that the result in Proposition
1 is robust, because conditional on continuing to serve, a legislator who votes
for the proposal in period 1 enjoys higher expected utility over the two periods
than he would by voting against.
Suppose now that between the two periods the identity of the agenda setter
may change. More precisely, assume that the probability with which the agenda
setter in period 1 continues is q. With probability 1   q in period 2 some other
person makes a proposal which is unrelated to voting in period 1, and yields
beneﬁts π to the legislator whose votes will be analyzed below.
Let the agenda setter in period 1 use the exclusion strategy. If the agenda
setter continues in period 2, his proposal in period 2 will be accepted by a
minimum winning coalition.
Consider now a given legislator in period 1, and suppose that all other leg-
islators vote for the proposal. Again, a single vote does not aﬀect the collective
decision and the proposal is approved. A legislator who votes for the pro-
posal obtains  1/3(1 + δ) + δ(q2/9 + (1   q)π), whereas voting against yields
 1/3(1 + δ) + δ (1   q)π. The diﬀerence is δq2/9 > 0. When q = 1 the trade-
oﬀ discussed in Section 4 applies. But for any strictly positive probability that
the agenda setter continues to serve, a legislator strictly prefers to vote for the
proposal in period 1.
If in period 1 each legislator expects all others to vote against the proposal,
no single vote would change the outcome of the collective decision which rejects
the proposal. But by voting for the proposal a legislator can ensure his member-
ship in the minimum winning coalition in period 2 if the agenda setter continues.
Thus, each legislator strictly prefers to support the proposal in period 1, and it
is not an equilibrium for each legislator to vote against it.
Consider now term limits. Term limits which make a legislator leave before
the agenda setter leaves mean that the legislator will not vote for a policy that
20beneﬁts the agenda setter.18 Speaking loosely, term limits may weaken the
power of the agenda setter. Instead, the agenda setter would have to form a
minimum winning coalition of beneﬁciaries in each period.19
A term limit applying to the agenda setter corresponds to q = 0 in the anal-
ysis above.20 Even in this case, the legislators can be exploited. Suppose the
current agenda setter will never serve again, but that some current member of
the legislature serves as the agenda setter in the future. The current agenda
setter can still propose a policy that beneﬁts himself greatly, while giving noth-
ing to all but one legislator. Let the current agenda setter propose a policy that
gives beneﬁts to himself and to one other legislator, say P, who may become
the agenda setter in the next period. Legislator P would then gain from threat-
ening that when he becomes the agenda setter, he will propose no beneﬁts to
any legislator who votes against the beneﬁts proposed to P in period 1. It is
therefore an equilibrium for all legislators to vote for the proposal in period 1,
and it is not an equilibrium for all to vote against.
5.2 Secret ballots
The agenda setter can be powerful even if voting is by secret ballot. Under a
secret ballot the agenda setter does not know who voted against him, and so
cannot later punish a particular defector. It appears that any one legislator
would want to vote no in period 1, and it appears that he would want to do
so if with even a small probability he will be decisive. But suppose that each
legislator faces a risk of not serving in the next period. The agenda setter can
then threaten to give priority to new legislators in the next period if the vote in
the current period is not unanimous. That is, in period 2 the minimum winning
coalition would include all new legislators, and (if needed) some continuing leg-
islators. Each legislator in period 1 who expects others to vote for the proposal
18Actually, the legislator is indiﬀerent and might as well vote in favor. Proposition 1 is
therefore robust, in the sense that it is still an equilibrium to approve the ﬁrst proposal, and
a minimum winning coalition approves the proposal in period 2.
19Whereas federal congressmen and senators in the U.S. face no term limits, some states do
impose term limits for state legislators. Given that these limits are often longer than eight
years, they do not seem to restrict the agenda setter’s power so much that he must form a
minimum winning coalition of beneﬁciaries in each period.
20Oﬃce holders may believe that a term limit will not be applied. An example of extending
term limits is mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City who won election to a third term.
21has an incentive to vote for the proposal. Turnover can increase the agenda
setter’s power.
The following formalizes this idea. Let a legislator continue in period 2
with probability q. As before, in period 2, each member of the minimum win-
ning coalition gains by supporting the agenda setter’s proposal, and it will
be adopted. The probability that a legislator belongs to the minimum win-
ning coalition in period 2, conditional on his continuing to serve, is pC 
2q2/3 + (1   q2) when members of the minimum winning coalition are chosen
ﬁrst from continuing legislators, and pN  2q2/3+(1 q)q when new legislators
have priority in becoming members of the minimum winning coalition.
Consider a given legislator in period 1 and suppose that all other legislators
vote for the proposal. In voting for the proposal he obtains  (1 + δq)/3 +
qδpC/3. A legislator who votes against the proposal does not reduce his tax
payments, but does cause the agenda setter to give priority to new legislators,
yielding the legislator expected beneﬁts of  (1 + δq)/3 + qδpN/3. Given that
pC > pN, the diﬀerence is strictly positive; thus, a legislator strictly prefers to
support the agenda setter’s proposal in period 1.
Could a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies have all legislators in
period 1 vote against the proposal? Denote by x the number of votes against the
proposal in period 1. Suppose the agenda setter threatens that in forming the
minimum winning coalition in period 2 he will give priority to new legislators
with probability r(x). Assume further that r(x) strictly increases with x. The
agenda setter is willing to follow such a strategy, because it costs him nothing.
Consider period 1 and suppose all legislators vote against the proposal. Again a
single vote does not aﬀect the collective decision which rejects the proposal. But
a legislator who votes for the proposal increases the chances that a continuing
member will belong to the minimum winning coalition. Hence, conditional on
continuing to serve, a legislator’s expected utility in period 2 is
1
3
δ
(
 1 + (1   r(x))pC + r(x)pN)
.
The legislator will have to pay taxes in period 2, and his chances of belonging
to the minimum winning coalition decline with r(x). Voting for the proposal
makes x = 2, whereas opposing the proposal makes x = 3. The legislator strictly
prefers to vote in favor if and only if r(3) > r(2). Hence, a legislator strictly
prefers to vote for the proposal in period 1; unanimous opposition is not an
22equilibrium.
5.3 Large legislatures, and partisan benets
Consider the agenda setter’s power when the legislature consists of more than
three members. For simplicity let the number of legislators, n, be an odd num-
ber.21 As before, assume simple majority voting, and let the agenda setter play
the exclusion strategy. Again, a minimum winning coalition will support his
proposal in period 2.
Consider period 1. Suppose all legislators vote for the proposal, so that no
individual vote is decisive. The expected utility of a legislator who votes for
the proposal is  (1+δ)/n+δ(n+1)/(2n2). The ﬁrst term is the taxes paid in
both periods, as both proposals are approved. The second term represents the
expected value of obtaining δ/n with probability (n + 1)/(2n). Voting against
the proposal in period 1 yields  (1 + δ)/n. The diﬀerence δ(n + 1)/(2n2) is
strictly positive. Again, a legislator will strictly prefer to support the period
1 proposal: it is an equilibrium for each legislator to vote for the proposal in
period 1. We see that the agenda setter beneﬁts from larger legislatures, as
(n + 1)/(2n), the share of the surplus given to the minimum winning coalition
in period 2, decreases with n.
As in our previous analysis, in period 1 this is the unique robust equilibrium
with symmetric pure strategies. A legislator who expects all others to vote
against the proposal strictly prefers to vote in favor, because his vote does not
change the outcome but assures the legislator of belonging to the minimum
winning coalition in period 2. Voting against the proposal makes him belong to
this coalition with the smaller probability (n + 1)/(2n).
Large legislatures allow us to consider super-majority rules. As now approval
of the proposal in period 2 requires more legislators, the agenda setter can
extract a smaller surplus in period 2.22 It can be shown, however, that if the
21This assumption simpliﬁes the exposition. Proposition 1 extends to even-sized legislatures
with at least four members requiring n=2 + 1 votes for approval. A two-person legislature
is special because majority rule eﬀectively becomes a unanimity rule and each legislator is
decisive.
22In the context of Proposition 1, the agenda setter makes no payments in period 1. With
more than three legislators the payments in period 1 in the context of Proposition 2 become
1=n (n m)=(n(n m+1)), where m is the number of votes in favor necessary for approval.
These payments increase with m.
23majority requirement is less than unanimity, the preceding argument applies,
and in period 1 all legislators vote for a policy that hurts all of them.
The results continue to hold when the agenda setter restricts beneﬁts to
members of the majority party. Suppose a majority party has n members and
a minority party has m members, with n > m + 2.23 Minority party members
expect to be excluded from a future minimum winning coalition because the
agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy but promises future beneﬁts only
to members of the majority party.24 The analysis described at the beginning
of this section can be applied, and so the following constitutes a sub-game
perfect equilibrium: the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy restricted to
members of the majority party; the proposal in period 1 is approved with the
votes of the majority party; the agenda setter’s proposal in period 2 is approved
by a minimum winning coalition (excluding at least one member of the majority
party).
Partisan behavior makes our assumption of a ﬁnitely repeated game (rather
than of an inﬁnitely repeated game) seem appropriate. An election after period
2 might change the majority party and the agenda setter. In the next term
the new agenda setter and legislature might play a similar sub-game perfect
equilibrium.
6 Overcoming the agenda setter's power
Some institutional arrangements, such as entitlements, may reduce the agenda
setter’s power by reducing his discretion, and other factors can increase a legis-
lator’s ability to resist exploitation.
6.1 Tacit collusion against the agenda setter
In the two-period model the agenda setter exploits the legislature to some extent.
This raises the question whether legislators can somehow agree on rejecting
exploitive proposals completely. We show now that if the legislators are expected
to punish deviations appropriately, then tacit collusion against the agenda setter
23For simplicity take n to be an odd number.
24Speaker Joseph Cannon, mentioned above, appeared to follow this strategy, in allowing the
leader of the minority party to appoint the minority members of committees. See Finocchiaro
(2002).
24might occur. To allow for such an agreement we consider a repeated game with
an inﬁnite horizon, where all players know at the beginning of the ﬁnal period
that the period is the ﬁnal one.25 As usual, this framework admits a multiplicity
of equilibria and very diﬀerent outcomes can be sustained; we will see that when
legislators cannot reach an agreement they might be exploited in every period.
Suppose that in each period, the game ends with probability 1   δ > 0, and
continues with probability δ > 0. Whether period t is the ﬁnal one is revealed
to all players at the beginning of period t, before a proposal is made. The same
agenda setter makes proposals in all periods.
The agenda setter modiﬁes the exclusion strategy in the following way. In
all but the ﬁnal period he proposes to retain the whole budget for himself and
threatens that in the ﬁnal period he will exclude any legislator who had earlier
voted against a proposal the agenda setter had made. In the ﬁnal period,
the agenda setter proposes to split the beneﬁts equally with the members of a
minimum winning coalition. All legislators who supported him in all periods
before the ﬁnal one have an equal chance of belonging to the minimum winning
coalition in the ﬁnal period. If a minimum winning coalition requires more
members than the number of legislators who supported all proposals before the
ﬁnal period’s proposal, then the remaining members are chosen, taking into
account the number of times each legislator had voted for the agenda setter’s
proposals. That is, the two legislators with the most votes in favor participate
with probability 1 (in case of ties, equal probabilities are assigned).
Consider the following strategy proﬁle for each of the three legislators. In
the ﬁnal period each legislator votes for the proposal if and only if he is a mem-
ber of the minimum winning coalition. Consider non-ﬁnal periods. In the ﬁrst
period each legislator votes against the agenda setter’s proposal. Each legisla-
tor continues to vote against proposals in any non-ﬁnal period t as long as all
legislators had voted against in all previous periods. If at least one legislator
supported a proposal in the past, then all legislator approve the next K propos-
als. So punishment requires the approval of K non-ﬁnal proposals. These are
the symmetric pure voting strategies in Proposition 1.
Consider the ﬁnal period. Again, a minimum winning coalition will approve
the proposal the agenda setter makes.
25Tacit collusion can also be sustained under a ﬁnite horizon of at least three periods. But
this requires asymmetric behavior of symmetric legislators, see Appendix A.2.
25Consider a non-ﬁnal period t, with all legislators voting against the proposal
(that is, they cooperate). Doing so yields zero payoﬀs in all non-ﬁnal periods
and  1/9 in the ﬁnal period; and because with probability 1  δ period t+1 is
the ﬁnal period, with probability δ(1   δ) period t + 2 is the ﬁnal period , and
so on, a legislator’s expected payoﬀ is
 
1
9
(
(1   δ) + δ(1   δ) + δ2(1   δ) + ...
)
=  
1
9
.
Now suppose that one legislator supports the proposal in period t (that is,
he defects). Notice that the payoﬀ in period t is still zero, as the proposal is
rejected by the majority. Because the consequence is punishment from fellow
legislators, in the next K non-ﬁnal periods the payoﬀ is  1/3. The reward is
certain membership in the minimum winning coalition yielding zero payoﬀs in
the ﬁnal period, because the deviator maintains a lead of one yes-vote over the
fellow legislators in all subsequent periods. Because with probability δ period
t+1 is a non-ﬁnal period, with probability δ2 period t+2 is a non-ﬁnal period,
and so on, a legislator’s expected payoﬀ is
 
δ
3
(
1 + δ + δ2 +  + δK 1)
.
We see that cooperation is sustainable if and only if
3δ
1   δK
1   δ
 1.
This inequalioty holds if the discount factor is large enough, because then it is
suﬃciently unlikely that the game ends soon, and thus the threat of punishment
is suﬃciently severe. Since the left hand side increases with K, a longer length
of punishment can sustain cooperation for lower discount factors.
Notice also that the agenda setter cannot reduce the sustainability of tacit
collusion through increased side payments. In the ﬁrst period a single deviation
cannot trigger side payments, as the proposal is still rejected. In later periods
the proposal is approved as part of the punishment, and side payments cannot
be credibly oﬀered.26
26A natural extension of the equilibrium with symmetric pure strategies in period 1 has
each legislator in the ﬁnal period vote for the proposal if and only if he is a member of
the minimum winning coalition, and in non-ﬁnal periods each legislator votes for the agenda
setter’s proposal. So payoﬀs in non-ﬁnal periods are  1=3, and in the ﬁnal period  1=9. If,
however, a legislator deviates and votes against the proposal in any non-ﬁnal period, he does
26Thus, when the future is suﬃciently important, legislators who use a grim
trigger strategy can eliminate exploitation completely. Other behavior, however,
is also possible, including the approval of exploitive proposals in every period
but the ﬁnal one.
6.2 Counter-threats
The analysis so far had the agenda setter threaten legislators with political
exclusion, and allowed a legislator to take only one action—vote. A legisla-
tor might, however, react to the exclusion strategy with s = 0 by making a
counter-threat to exclude the current agenda setter if the legislator in question
later becomes the agenda setter. The following enriches the basic model to
capture this possibility; we show that in equilibrium the legislators will still be
exploited—albeit less than if diﬀerent agenda setters, serving for two periods
each, each play the exclusion strategy with s = 0.
Let the legislature consist of ﬁve members, with one of them the agenda
setter, and with all paying taxes and voting. Voting occurs over two legislative
terms, each consisting of two periods. Legislator 1 is the agenda setter in the
ﬁrst two periods; each of the other four legislators is equally likely to be the
agenda setter in the following two periods.27
Given our assumption of uncertainty over the future agenda setter and the
symmetry among legislators who are not the agenda setter in period 1, let each
react to the exclusion strategy with s = 0 by making the following counter-
threat: if the agenda setter in period 1 does not make a payment of s in period
1, he will be excluded from the minimum winning coalition in period 4 in case
the legislator making the threat becomes the agenda setter in period 3. If the
agenda setter makes the requested payment he will belong to the minimum
winning coalition in period 4 with certainty.28
not aﬀect policy and payoﬀs in non-ﬁnal periods, but is punished by the agenda setter in the
ﬁnal period, obtaining only  1=3. The diﬀerence is 2=9 > 0, the analogue to the diﬀerence in
the context of Proposition 1 that now takes into account the inﬁnite horizon.
27Excluding the possibility of legislator 1 being the agenda setter in the second term makes
the counter-threat more credible and exploitation in the ﬁrst term more diﬃcult.
28Again, the agenda setter is assumed to treat each legislator equally, which is here moti-
vated by the uncertainty over the identity of the next agenda setter. Assuming that the agenda
setter of the second term is known and that period 1 payments can be individualized would
not aﬀect exploitation in period 1, but would aﬀect the distribution within the legislature.
27Proceeding by backward induction, consider the last period. Notice that even
if the two agenda setters are both certain to belong to the minimum winning
coalition in the last period, one slot is still open, and the second agenda setter
can appropriately reward votes that had been cast in period 3. Note also that
the second agenda setter is willing to exclude or to include the agenda setter
of periods 1 and 2 in the last period’s minimum winning coalition because this
costs him nothing. Thus it is an equilibrium for the second agenda setter to
play the exclusion strategy with s = 0, for the proposal he makes in period 3
to win unanimous approval, and for the proposal he makes in period 4 to be
approved by a minimum winning coalition that includes the ﬁrst agenda setter.
Consider the ﬁrst term, or periods 1 and 2. The preceding makes it clear
that for any exclusion strategy, an equilibrium exists in which the legislature
approves the proposals made in periods 1 and 2.
Consider the ﬁrst agenda setter; call him A1. Suppose that A1 ignores the
threat, so that s = 0 and that A1 will be excluded from the minimum winning
coalition in period 4. On the other hand, if A1 gives in, he is assured of belonging
to the minimum winning coalition in period 4, at a cost of s. Giving in is better
if and only if  4s + δ3/5  0, which is equivalent to s  δ3/20.
The optimal counter-threat thus has s = δ3/20. The above strategies thus
constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium. We summarize with
Proposition 3 With two terms and a change in agenda setters, a sub-game
perfect equilibrium exists in which:
In the rst term
 the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = δ3/20 and
 in period 1 the legislature unanimously approves the agenda setter's pro-
posal; in period 2 a minimum winning coalition approves the proposal the
agenda setter makes in that period.
In the second term
 the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = 0 and
 in period 3 the legislature unanimously approves the agenda setter's pro-
posal; in period 4 a minimum winning coalition which includes the rst
agenda setter approves the proposal the agenda setter makes in that period.
28A counter-threat beneﬁts the legislators, but the ﬁrst agenda setter still
obtains at least 4/5 of the period 1 beneﬁts.
6.3 Entitlements
One may think that the agenda setter necessarily gains from committing future
policy. But here the opposite occurs. Suppose that whatever policy is adopted in
period 1 will also hold in period 2. Roughly speaking, we can think of policies
subject to annual appropriations, and of entitlements which remain in force
unless explicitly changed. Then in period 1 the agenda setter could no longer
threaten to punish in period 2 a legislator who voted against the proposal in
period 1. The best the agenda setter could do in period 1 is to propose a policy
that gives zero net beneﬁts to members of the minimum winning coalition; that
generates lower beneﬁts to the agenda setter than he could obtain if he had
power to set the agenda in both periods.
A diﬀerent question is what happens if the policy adopted in period 1 con-
tinues in force in period 2, unless the agenda setter proposes an amendment,
which the legislature supports; that is, the default policy in period 2 is the pol-
icy adopted in period 1, rather than no spending and no taxes in period 2. If
in period 1 the legislature adopted a policy that gives all beneﬁts to the agenda
setter, in the next period the agenda setter of period 1 would not want to change
the policy. By assumption, only the agenda setter in period 1 can propose a
new policy in period 2. Therefore, in period 1 no legislator would support the
policy that gives himself negative beneﬁts in period 1, and the agenda setter
does best in period 1 by proposing a policy that generates zero net beneﬁts to
each member of the minimum winning coalition. Put diﬀerently, the agenda
setter would prefer annual appropriations over entitlements: the default policy
strongly aﬀects the agenda setter’s power.
6.4 Separation of budgetary powers
Our results do not require that in each period the decisions on taxation and
spending are bundled. But if they are not bundled, they require that funds are
already approved.
Let spending in each of the two periods be ﬁxed at one dollar, so that the
29three legislators vote only on how to allocate the dollar.29 In any period in
which the proposal is rejected, each legislator gets zero beneﬁts. Assume that
the agenda setter plays an exclusion strategy in which he oﬀers in period 2 a
small beneﬁt b > 0 to members of the winning coalition.
In period 2, no member of the minimum winning coalition gains from oppos-
ing the proposal, and the legislature passes it. Consider now a given legislator in
period 1, with all other legislators voting for the proposal. When the legislator
in question votes for the proposal he gets bδ2/3, whereas in voting against he
gets nothing. Thus, a legislator strictly prefers to support the agenda setter’s
proposal in period 1, and it is an equilibrium for each legislator to vote for that
proposal.30
Could a Nash equilibrium in symmetric pure strategies have all legislators
in period 1 vote against the proposal? If they do, a legislator who votes for the
proposal will belong to the minimum winning coalition in period 2, obtaining
bδ. Opposing the proposal reduces the chance of belonging to the minimum
winning coalition in period 2, so that total payoﬀs are bδ2/3. Thus, a legislator
strictly prefers to vote for the proposal in period 1; it is not an equilibrium for
all legislators to vote against it.
Put diﬀerently, the agenda setter would prefer separation of budgetary pow-
ers over combined taxation and spending decisions. But suppose that in period
2 the vote on taxes is held before the vote on spending. We just saw that the
agenda setter will oﬀer to give very little of the spending to each member of the
minimum winning coalition. So all legislators, anticipating that, vote against
the tax. The agenda setter would then be unable to exploit in period 1.
7 Conclusion
It is well known that an agenda setter enjoys power which he can use to his own
beneﬁt. But this paper showed much more, suggesting that by using promises
and threats the agenda setter in the initial period can gain all the beneﬁts from
legislation, impose large costs on all legislators, while getting large majorities to
29An analogous result holds if an entitlement program sets beneﬁts to all legislators, but in
each period the legislature decides how to allocate taxes among its members.
30A technical issue concerns the existence of the optimal amount to oﬀer. That may be
solved by making the realistic assumption that a smallest monetary unit exists.
30support such a selﬁsh policy. An implication for interpreting observed behavior
is that wide support for policy need not mean wide beneﬁts from that policy.
Conventional wisdom deﬁnes agenda-setting power as “the ability to make
proposals that are diﬃcult to amend” (see e.g. Tsebelis and Garret 1996). For
most of the paper we made the benchmark assumption that the agenda setter
has such absolute power. Not surprisingly, when this formal power is reduced
(such as when any one agenda setter serves for a limited time) exploitation is
reduced.
The extreme assumption on the formal power of the agenda setter allowed
us to identify two additional informal conditions for exercising power. First,
power depends on the ability to reward and punish legislators, requiring discre-
tion or the ability to allocate future beneﬁts. Entitlements remove discretion
completely. Exercising power also requires that the agenda setter identify sup-
porters in early periods. Though a secret ballot makes identiﬁcation impossible,
we showed that when terms are staggered and legislators run for re-election at
diﬀerent times (as in the U.S. Senate) the agenda setter’s power is restored.
Second, power depends on an individual legislators’ incentives to resist exploita-
tion. These incentives increase with the likelihood that a vote is decisive, which
likelihood is maximized under sequential voting; and the incentives to resist
exploitation can also be sustained through tacit collusion by the legislators,
though other behavior is also possible.
Agenda-setting models can also apply to an autocrat in a nondemocratic
regime, because even an autocrat needs support for his policies from some, say
the political elite (see e.g. Diermeier and Fong 2011). With such an inter-
pretation, our analysis implies that the autocrat might be less constrained in
exploiting the elite than commonly thought. Moreover, the autocrat prefers
that his future power be restricted. For if he had dictatorial powers in the ﬁnal
period, then he could not credibly promise future rewards and would get little
beneﬁts in earlier periods. Paradoxically, the expectation of more formal power
endows the proposer with less real power. Put diﬀerently, weakness creates
strength.
Our model can also apply to special interest politics. Suppose a special
interest group promises to give the agenda setter ten thousand dollars if the leg-
islature approves a policy that beneﬁts the special interest, but harms the leg-
islators. The agenda setter uses his exclusion strategy to get the policy passed.
31This can explain the puzzle of the surprisingly small rent-seeking expenditures
by special interest groups, ﬁrst noted by Tullock (1972).
Similar strategies can be used by a party leader to ensure the support of
party members. An incumbent can incentivize loyalty of potential successors in
a current period by promising all candidates a chance of becoming his political
heir. Such an approach appears to have been used in 2013 by the head of the
Bavarian Government and ruling party, who refused to name his successor but
instead kept alive the prospects of several candidates. The same approach was
used by prime minister Aznar in Spain.
The qualitative eﬀects of our model can explain some stylized facts. For
example, the agenda setter does better for himself, and garners stronger ma-
jorities, in earlier periods of power than in his ﬁnal term. That ﬁts the pattern
of a lame duck president losing power. The results can also explain why an
agenda setter may not constrain future policy; the ability to change policy in
the future is precisely what gives the agenda setter the ability to threaten leg-
islators in earlier periods. And our analysis is consistent with the observation
that a legislative district may get more beneﬁts the more closely allied are its
representatives with the agenda setter (which can be a political party control-
ling the central government). Evidence from the United States (see Larcinese,
Rizzo and Testa 2006), Spain (see Sol´ e-Oll´ e and Sorribas-Navarro 2008), Israel
(see Rozevitch and Weiss 1993), Brazil (see Brollo and Nannicini 2010), and
Japan (see Tamura 2010) show that local governments under the control of the
same party as the central government receive higher transfers from the central
government.
The results of this paper can be viewed in at least three ways. First, the
results could explain the power that some agenda setters possess, as exempli-
ﬁed by Speaker Cannon discussed in the Introduction. Second, the results can
be viewed as predicting that because an agenda setter can exercise so much
power, institutions may arise to limit such power. That indeed happened when
the House of Representatives changed its internal rules to reduce Speaker Can-
non’s power. Or, a legislature may allow amendments from the ﬂoor. And the
existence of multiple agenda setters, each in a diﬀerent area, can reduce agenda-
setting power: if it will be long before the next time that an area turns up, then
the agenda setter in that area must oﬀer a large side payment for legislators to
approve his proposal.
32Third, the results can suggest that though an agenda setter has the power
to induce a legislature to adopt policies which beneﬁt him alone, agenda setters
often have goals other than personal beneﬁts. Earlier we had discussed how
an agenda setter may favor members of his own party. Or, as Margolis (1984)
suggests, political leaders may be altruistic at least in part, aiming to further
the public good, or to go down in history as benefactors of the country.
33A Appendix
A.1 Mixed-strategy equilibria in the benchmark
Under majority rule, the equilibrium in period 1 can also have each legislator
vote for the proposal with positive probability less than 1. A mixed strategy
allows for trading oﬀ the increased chance of belonging to the minimum winning
coalition in period 2 with the increased probability that an exploitive policy is
approved in period 1. This appendix explores, analogously to Proposition 2, the
conditions under which a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, and investigates
whether the agenda setter can oﬀer suﬃcient side payments s to induce the
equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Consider a given legislator and suppose the other two legislators vote with
probability x for the proposal. If the legislator votes for the proposal, his chances
of becoming a member of the minimum winning coalition in period 2 are higher,
the more often the realizations of the other legislators’ mixed strategies specify
a vote against the period 1 proposal. More precisely, expected payoﬀs are given
by
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On the other hand, a legislator who votes against the proposal has a chance
of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period 2 only when at least
one other legislator votes against, in which case the proposal in period 1 is
rejected. Expected payoﬀs are thus
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A legislator is indiﬀerent between voting for and against the proposal if and
only if
x2   x
(
1  
δ
6
)
+
δ
6
+ 3x(1   x)s = 0.
34Because this equation is quadratic, there exist two equilibria in mixed strate-
gies. Given the unique robust symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium described in
Proposition 1, in period 1 the number of symmetric equilibria is therefore three.
Figure 1 shows these equilibria for diﬀerent side payments s and discount
factors δ. Given a side payment, say s = 0, which indicates the right-most dis-
continuous curve, for any δ the two mixed-strategy equilibria have very diﬀerent
comparative statics. For the ﬁrst equilibrium (the lower part of the discontin-
uous curve), an increase in the discount factor δ increases the probability that
a legislator votes for the proposal; in the second equilibrium (the upper part of
the discontinuous curve) the opposite holds.31 As δ increases the mixed-strategy
equilibria converge towards each other.
Interestingly, with more legislators and a discount factor smaller than 1, this
convergence might be complete: mixed-strategy equilibria appear not to exist
for high discount factors. When the future is important enough, the legislator
strictly prefers to increase his chances of membership in the minimum winning
coalition in period 2 rather than to reduce the probability that an exploitive
policy is approved in period 1. For example, with ﬁve legislators and an agenda
setter, for a mixed-strategy equilibrium to exist the discount factor must be
smaller than 0.6.32
The right-most discontinuous curve in Figure 1 applies when s = 0; curves
further to the left are based on higher payments. The most the agenda setter is
willing to pay to each legislator in order to induce the equilibrium in Proposition
1 is t = (1   x3   3x2(1   x))/3, because x3 + 3x2(1   x) is his expected payoﬀ
31One could argue that the ﬁrst equilibrium is more appealing than the second. First, it
is plausible that as the future becomes more important the period 1 proposal is more often
approved. Second, as the discount factor approaches zero, the ﬁrst equilibrium converges to
the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which the proposal is unanimously rejected. The
second equilibrium converges to unanimous approval. For  = 0, unanimous approval is only
sustained in equilibrium because of a coordination failure. Third, for any discount factor the
expected payoﬀs are strictly higher at the ﬁrst equilibrium. Lastly, when there is a collective
mistake in which everyone mixes with slightly diﬀerent probability, the ﬁrst equilibrium is
stable, whereas the second equilibrium is unstable.
32With ﬁve legislators, a mixed strategy allows for trading oﬀ the increased chance of
membership in the minimum winning coalition in period 2, given by (1   x)42=25 + x(1  
x)31=10 + x2(1   x)22=15 + x3(1   x)3=20 + x43=25, with the increased probability that
an exploitive policy is approved in period 1, x2(1   x)2=5. The former is always larger than
(1=2)4(16=75), whereas the latter is at most (1=2)4(1=15). Equality can therefore not hold
for large .
35in period 1 from the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
The ﬁgure shows that when the discount factor is suﬃciently large (roughly
greater than 0.6), the agenda setter can avoid a mixed-strategy equilibrium by
making side payments. For low discount factors, however, the equilibrium in
Proposition 1 cannot be induced. When the future is not suﬃciently important,
a legislator little values membership in the minimum winning coalition in period
2, and strictly prefers to reduce the probability that an exploitive policy is
approved in period 1. In these situations playing a mixed strategy can thus
protect the legislature from complete exploitation—although it cannot eliminate
the exploitation completely.
A.2 Tacit collusion with a nitely repeated game
Even with only three periods the legislature can avoid payments to the agenda
setter in the ﬁrst period, and reduce exploitation in the second. To do so
it requests (in the ﬁrst two periods) side payments threatening to play the
asymmetric equilibrium in the current period. Moreover, in the ﬁrst period
the legislature can increase side payments further to 1/3 by threatening fellow
legislators to punish the acceptance of less than 1/3 by playing the unanimous
approval equilibrium in the second period. As in the main text, if in period 2
punishment of fellow legislators requires approval, the agenda setter does not
oﬀer side payments. This increases the stakes in period 1 and makes it possible
to require higher side payments in the earlier period.
Suppose there are three periods and the agenda setter plays the exclusion
strategy as explained in the main text, but paying s1 and s2 in the ﬁrst two
periods. We show that the legislature can request to set
ˆ s1 = 1/3, ˆ s2 = (2   δ)/6.
We say the second period is a punishment phase if some legislator voted in
favor of the ﬁrst period proposal although side payments were strictly smaller
than 1/3. In this case set ˆ s2 = 0 and notice that the agenda setter has no
incentive to pay more than that; he modiﬁes the exclusion strategy accordingly.
Consider the following strategies:
 Legislator 1 approves all proposals, except if the second period is a pun-
ishment phase.
36 Legislators 2 and 3 approve the proposal in the ﬁnal period if and only
if they belong to the minimum winning coalition. They approve the ﬁrst
and second proposal if and only if s  ˆ st,t = 1,2.
We proceed by backward induction. Consider the ﬁnal period. As before
the proposal is approved by a minimum winning coalition.
Consider period 2. Suppose it is punishment phase. A legislator who does
not punish does not change policy but is less likely to belong to the minimum
winning coalition in period 3; so all punish. The agenda setter cannot do better.
Suppose it is not punishment phase. Legislators 2 and 3 are pivotal and (follow-
ing the analysis in Subsection 4.1) prefer to vote in favor if and only if s  ˆ s2.
Legislator 1 cannot change policy, and so cannot gain from voting against. The
agenda setter cannot do better than setting ˆ s2 = (2   δ)/6.
Consider period 1. Suppose s1 = 1/3. A legislator who does not vote in
favor does not change policy but is less likely to belong to the minimum winning
coalition in period 3; so all vote in favor. Suppose s1 < 1/3. Legislators 2 and
3 are pivotal. Voting in favor makes sure to belong to the winning coalition in
period 3 but implies that period 2 is punishment phase, so payoﬀ is
 
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+ s1 +
δ2
3
.
Not deviating and voting against foregoes current side payments but assures
side payments in period 2 yielding
 
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Voting against is beneﬁcial because
 
1
3
+ s1   δ(2   δ)/6 +
δ2
6
= s1  
1
3
  δ(1   δ)/3 < 0.
Legislator 1 cannot change policy, and so cannot gain from voting against. Thus
the agenda setter cannot do better than oﬀering ˆ s1 = 1/3.
Similar to the inﬁnite horizon, the ﬁnite horizon can sustain very diﬀerent
behavior in equilibrium. This includes the possibility that multiple periods allow
the agenda setter to exploit the legislature in more periods. We remark that
exploitation may hold for any ﬁnite number of periods.
Consider T periods, denoted by t = 1,...,T. A value of T = 2 gives the
setting of Section 4. Again, the agenda setter modiﬁes the exclusion strategy
37as stated in the main text and a minimum winning coalition will approve the
proposal the agenda setter makes in the ﬁnal period.
Consider now a given legislator in any period t before the ﬁnal one, with
all other legislators voting for the proposal in that period. Because a single
vote does not change the outcome of the collective decision which approves the
proposal, by voting for the proposal the legislator obtains
 
1   δT t
3(1   δ)
+
2δT t 1
9
,
the discounted value of tax payments in all periods plus the option value of po-
tential membership in the minimum winning coalition in period T. A legislator
who votes against the proposal does not reduce his tax, but excludes himself
from future beneﬁts, yielding him expected beneﬁts of
 
1   δT t
3(1   δ)
.
Because the diﬀerence is strictly positive, a legislator strictly prefers to support
the proposals made in periods t < T. It follows that there is a sub-game
perfect equilibrium in symmetric pure strategies with each legislator voting for
the agenda setter’s proposal in each period t < T, and in the ﬁnal period a
minimum winning coalition approves the agenda setter’s proposal.
Thus even under a ﬁnite horizon legislators can reduce exploitation consider-
ably. Again, other behavior is also possible, including the approval of exploitive
proposals in every period but the ﬁnal one.
B Not intended for publication
This appendix is for the convenience of the referees and not intended for pub-
lication. We substantiate the claims we made in footnotes 8, 12 and 17 of the
main text.
B.1 The model with three agents
Consider a legislature composed by three legislators. All pay taxes and vote,
and agent 1 is the agenda setter. In this Appendix we show that the results
in Section 4 are robust: (i) there are two equilibria in pure voting strategies in
which the ﬁrst proposal is approved; (ii) there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium
38for low discount factors; and (iii) side payments are monotonically increasing in
a legislator’s pivotal probability.
As with four agents, in period 2 the agenda setter oﬀers zero net beneﬁts to
one other legislator (paying 1/3) who votes surely for this proposal. In fact, in
any sub-game perfect equilibrium, in period 2 the agenda setter oﬀers zero net
beneﬁts to one other legislator who votes surely for this proposal.33
We start with statement (i). Consider period 1. Suppose agent 1 votes for
his proposal. The payoﬀs of agents 2 and 3 are summarized in the following
table.
agent 1 votes yes
yes no
yes  (1 + δ)/3 + s + δ/6, (1 + δ)/3 + s + δ/6  1/3 + s, (1 + δ)/3 + s
no  (1 + δ)/3 + s, 1/3 + s  δ/6, δ/6
Suppose agent 1 votes against his proposal. The payoﬀs of agents 2 and 3
are summarized in the following table.
agent 1 votes no
yes no
yes  (1 + δ)/3 + s + δ/6, (1 + δ)/3 + s + δ/6 0, δ/3
no  δ/3,0  δ/6, δ/6
Notice that for any value of s, (yes,yes,yes) is an equilibrium. Moreover,
(no,no,no) is not an equilibrium, as agents 2 and 3 strictly beneﬁt from devi-
ating. Thus Proposition 1 is robust.
Without side payments, that is s = 0, there is an asymmetric equilibrium:
(yes,no,no). If, however, side payments are high enough, that is s  (2 δ)/6 >
33 To see why, suppose the agenda setter has oﬀered zero net beneﬁts to one other legislator.
Assume there is a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which this legislator is not sure to vote
for the proposal. Then with some probability, say p, the agenda setter obtains zero beneﬁts
and forgoes p=3 beneﬁts. He would be better oﬀ oﬀering a small beneﬁt, say b < p=3, to the
legislator. Suppose b > 0 is the optimal choice. The fact that b=2 also assures approval of the
proposal at lower costs implies that b cannot be optimal and that the agenda setter has no
best response proposal. By deﬁnition equilibrium decisions must be mutually best responses.
Thus the only such combination is for the agenda setter to oﬀer zero net beneﬁts to one other
legislator who votes surely for this proposal.
390, then it is a dominant strategy for agents 2 and 3 to vote in favor. Notice that
agents 2 and 3 are now in a prisoners’ dilemma. The more important the future,
the worse the cooperative outcome, and so the lower the side payment can be
that make defection acceptable. Thus Proposition 2 is robust; this implies the
robustness of Corollary 1.
Consider statement (ii). Given that the agenda setter votes yes, there is also
an equilibrium in which agents 2 and 3 use symmetric mixed-strategies. The
mixing probabilities are given by
x = 1  
δ
2(1   3s)
.
Notice that these are linear functions of δ that start at x = 1 for δ = 0 and cut
the horizontal axes x = 0 at δ = 2   6s , s = (2   δ)/6.
Consider statement (iii). Assume that the agenda setter votes yes. Suppose
legislator 3 votes with probability p against the proposal and makes legislator
2 pivotal. It is straightforward to see that legislator 2 prefers to support the
agenda setter’s proposal in period 1 if and only if
s  ˜ s(p)  max
{
2   δ
6
 
1   p
p
δ
6
,0
}
.
Again, the threshold ˜ s(p) increases monotonically in the pivotal probability p,
until the payments under sequential voting are reached. The diﬀerence in the
functional form comes from the fact that agent 1 is always a member of the
period 2 minimum winning coalition, and thus only one slot is left.
B.2 Unpredictable agenda setter
Because in the result in Proposition 1 the agenda setter randomizes among the
legislators that supported his proposal in period 1, it is based on the indiﬀer-
ence of the agenda setter among members of the period 2 coalition. We show
now that there are other situations in which the choice of the agenda setter is
unpredictable for the legislature.34
When legislators do not pay the same taxes, the agenda setter prefers to in-
clude some districts over others in his period 2 coalition. For simplicity suppose
that legislators pay the following taxes (t1,t2,t3) = (1/3   ϵ,1/3,1/3 + ϵ).
34The example we give is related to the micro-foundations for contest success functions in
Corch´ on and Dahm (2010 and 2011).
40Assume further that the agenda setter likes some legislators more than oth-
ers, but that the legislators are uncertain about his preferences. To be precise,
suppose that Θ = [0,1] is the set of states of the world, and θ is an element,
which from the perspective of the legislators is uniformly distributed on Θ. The
functions Vi(θ) with i = 1,2,3 specify the utility of the agenda setter of includ-
ing agent i in the period 2 coalition. We assume that V1(θ) = θ = 1 V3(θ) and
V2(θ) = 1/2. Thus all have the same expectations, but the utility of including
legislator 2 is certain.
The agenda setter’s payoﬀ of including a set of agents T in period 2 is given
by
UT = aST +
∑
i2T
Vi(θ)  
∑
i2T
Πi,
where ST is the share of the surplus that the agenda setter can keep to himself,
a is a parameter, and Π is an emotional penalty. If legislator i voted against
the period 1 proposal, Πi is a large number and zero otherwise.
Provided all legislators support the period 1 proposal, the expected payoﬀ
of the agenda setter from the diﬀerent period 2 coalitions is
Uf1;2g = a(1/3 + ϵ) + 1/2 + θ
Uf1;3g = a/3 + 1
Uf2;3g = a(1/3   ϵ) + 3/2   θ
Uf1;2;3g = 3/2
We see that (i) the agenda setter is not indiﬀerent among members of the
period 2 coalition, and (ii) if the monetary beneﬁts are important enough for the
agenda setter (that is a  3/2), his choices are unpredictable. For θ  1/2 ϵ he
chooses agents 2 and 3, while for larger θ agents 1 and 2 are chosen. Given the
uniform distribution, provided legislators support the period 1 proposal they
have the following probabilities of belonging to the period 2 coalition: (1/2  
ϵ,1,1/2+ϵ). Setting ϵ = 1/6 yields the inclusion probabilities (in the minimum
winning coalition in period 2) mentioned in footnote 12 of the main text. We
remark that setting ϵ = 0 still yields asymmetric inclusion probabilities.
B.3 Heterogeneous legislators
Legislators might value the future diﬀerently because they face diﬀerent re-
election probabilities in the next election, or because some legislators prefer
41beneﬁts sooner than others (Tsai and Yang 2010). We suppose now that dis-
count factors diﬀer across legislators, but are (strictly) positive and common
knowledge. Notice ﬁrst that this change in assumptions does not aﬀect the
benchmark result in Proposition 1, because the agenda setter’s strategy relies
only on the discount factors being (strictly) positive.
In the context of Proposition 2, however, side payments are strictly positive
and depend on the (common) discount factor. Suppose the agenda setter chooses
the size of the common side payments such that it becomes a (weakly) dominant
strategy for the two legislators who value the future most to vote for the proposal
in period 1. The third legislator will realize that his vote does not aﬀect the
outcome in period 1; but he realizes that a positive vote increases his chances to
belong to the minimum winning coalition in period 2. The proposal in period 1
is therefore unanimously approved. The agenda setter can do no better because
reducing the side payments induces the asymmetric voting equilibrium. The
above strategies thus constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium, showing the
robustness of Proposition 2.
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Figure 1: Mixed-strategy equilibria for diﬀerent values of δ and s.
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